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THE FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST 
IMPROVEMENTS ACT:  DO WE REALLY WANT TO 
RETURN TO AMERICAN BANANA? 
Joseph P. Bauer* 
It keeps getting worse and worse.  Over the past three and a half decades, the 
Supreme Court has made countless changes to substantive antitrust doctrine, 
making successful assertion of an antitrust claim more and more difficult.1  We 
have known for at least a century—at least since the Standard Oil decision2—that 
the language in section 1 of the Sherman Act, providing that “every contract, 
combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . , is declared to be illegal”3 
is not to be read literally.  “Every” does not mean “every.”  It means only 
“some”—generally, only those restraints of trade which are “unreasonable.” 
The procedural obstacles facing a plaintiff even hoping for its day in court, to 
attempt to prove the harms it suffered from a defendant’s anti-competitive 
behavior, have also gotten much higher.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that 
“any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained . . . .”4  But we know that this language is also not to be 
taken literally.  Once again, “any” only means “some.”  There are numerous 
limitations with respect to the persons who may sue, including in particular 
requirements for showing standing and antitrust injury.5 
In an article I wrote about a decade ago, I asserted that judicial hostility to the 
prosecution of antitrust claims was reflected in the erection of ever-steeper 
procedural barriers to satisfying the prerequisites for asserting a claim for antitrust 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  B.A. Univ. of Pa.; J.D. Harvard Law School.  
Maine Law Review granted the right to separately publish an abbreviated version of this article in  
COMPETITION LAW AND THE STATE (Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 
2012).   I wish to thank Erin Orndorff, Notre Dame Law class of 2013, for her assistance with this 
article.   
 1. Among the “highlights” of this litany of cases are Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 
U.S. 373 (1911) and holding that vertical price restraints are unlawful only under a rule of reason 
analysis, and are not subject to a standard of per se unreasonableness); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (overruling portions of several prior cases, and rejecting the 
previously approved presumption regarding a tying arrangement that a patent confers the requisite 
power on the seller of the tying product); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that only certain concerted refusals to deal are subject to a 
standard of per se unreasonableness, and that most such restraints will be tested under the rule of 
reason); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 
v. United States, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and holding that vertical non-price restraints are unlawful only 
under a rule of reason analysis, and are not subject to a standard of per se unreasonableness). 
 2. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 5. See generally JOSEPH P. BAUER, 11 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ch. 78 (1998). 
2012] FTAIA: RETURN TO AMERICAN BANANA? 5 
relief.6  Subsequently, four years ago, in the much-criticized Twombly decision,7 
the Supreme Court imposed new, and substantially higher, pleading requirements 
on victims of alleged antitrust violations.8  These burdens have made it more 
difficult to get past the pleading stage and on to pre-trial discovery, where the 
plaintiffs would have access to the evidence demonstrating those violations. 
The combination of these enhanced standing and pleading requirements is that 
it is far less likely that a court will ever reach the merits of the defendants’ alleged 
anti-competitive conduct.  These decisions are emblematic of an attempt by the 
judiciary both to limit the substantive reach of the antitrust laws and to restrict 
those persons who may challenge allegedly unlawful behavior. 
But those cases are the subject of other articles.  Here, I will focus on yet one 
more barrier to the successful assertion of an antitrust claim – the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”).9  While there is extensive 
disagreement about the specifics with respect to what behavior and structure the 
antitrust laws should seek to prohibit or permit, there is broad, general consensus 
on the goals of the antitrust laws.  They are enhancement of consumer welfare, the 
promotion of competition, and compensation of the victims of antitrust violations.  
Regrettably, the FTAIA has significantly undermined the achievement of these 
goals. 
The obstacles erected by FTAIA are the result both of that initial legislative act 
and subsequent restrictive judicial interpretation.  As will be described below, the 
FTAIA precludes the maintenance of certain claims for behavior occurring in part 
or in whole outside the United States.  The explicitly stated purpose of the Act was 
to benefit American businesses, and in particular the American export trade.  The 
House Report10 indicates that the statute had two purposes.  In the years leading up 
to its passage, understandably courts had given different interpretations to the reach 
of the antitrust laws.  Thus, the FTAIA was designed to reduce this uncertainty.11  
But the stated primary purpose of the statute was to address the “apparent 
perception among businessmen that American antitrust laws are a barrier to joint 
export activities that promote efficiencies in the export of American goods and 
services.”12  Withdrawing the application of the antitrust laws to certain export 
activities presumably would enhance domestic prosperity, without causing harm to 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement:  Raising the Barriers for 
Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L.REV. 437 (2001). 
 7. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 8. These pleading requirements were further explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 
(holding that a civil rights complaint challenging allegedly arbitrary arrest and harsh conditions of 
detention failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).  FTAIA was in fact enacted as a 
part of a broader piece of legislation, the Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 
1233 (1982). 
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 (1982). 
 11. “[C]ourts differ in their expression of the proper test for determining whether United States 
antitrust jurisdiction over international transactions exists.  H.R 5235 addresses these problems of 
perception and definition by clarifying the Sherman Act . . . .”  Id. at 2. 
 12. Id. 
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American consumers.13 
However, judicial interpretation of the FTAIA—by giving an increasingly 
expansive reading to those actions which can not be brought in American courts—
has had a most unfortunate, and undoubtedly unintended effect.  These cumulative 
decisions have contributed to significant reductions in the ability of the antitrust 
laws to achieve the goals just described. 
A major step in that direction was the Supreme Court’s Empagran decision, in 
which the Court denied relief to certain plaintiffs complaining of a worldwide 
price-fixing conspiracy.14  Subsequently, courts have interpreted the exclusions in 
the FTAIA even more broadly, thereby undermining the important role of 
American antitrust law. 
Empagran itself probably had a neutral effect on American businesses and 
consumers.  There, the Supreme Court sought to rein in the use by non-American 
plaintiffs of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, to activities which neither took place in 
the United States nor directly harmed Americans.  But, remarkably, more recent 
case law under FTAIA affirmatively harms American plaintiffs.  It denies them 
relief under the antitrust laws for foreign behavior which raises prices paid by 
American individuals and businesses.  The result is a reduction in the consumer 
welfare that the antitrust laws are designed to promote and protect.  This can hardly 
be consistent with the purposes of the FTAIA. 
In Part I of this article, I review some of the principal pre-FTAIA decisions—
two from the U.S. Supreme Court, two from courts of appeals—that sought to craft 
rules with respect to the extra-territorial reach of the antitrust laws.  In Part II, I 
describe the specific standards set out by Congress in 1982 in the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act and describe the major interpretive questions.  In Part 
III, I review a number of judicial decisions applying FTAIA.  I argue that too many 
courts have given an overly expansive reach to the exclusions from the antitrust 
laws for certain behavior having a foreign or international component, and that 
these decisions are both inconsistent with the goals of the drafters of FTAIA and 
harmful to the interests of American competitors and American consumers. 
I. 
The state of the law with respect to the reach of the American antitrust laws to 
foreign activities has had a long and twisted history.  I start with the seminal case, 
now over a century old:  American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.15  The plaintiff 
and the defendant were both American corporations.  The defendant owned 
numerous banana plantations in Central America, and exported bananas to the 
United States.  The plaintiff purchased the interests of someone who had developed 
a rival plantation in Panama and was building a railway to deliver its bananas to a 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2002) (“the Act 
demonstrated Congress’s intent to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions not injuring the 
United States economy, thereby relieving exporters from a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade”) 
(emphasis added). 
 14. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (discussed in detail infra 
notes 59-73 and accompanying text). 
 15. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
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port for export to the United States. 
The plaintiff’s lawsuit alleged that a number of acts undertaken by the 
defendant in Central America—including acquiring real property of and stock 
interests in competing corporations, entering into price fixing agreements, and 
inducing governmental authorities in Panama to seize the plaintiff’s plantation16—
gave rise to claims under the Sherman Act.  Notwithstanding the fact that both 
parties were American—and, although not mentioned in the opinion, that the 
defendant’s acts might have given rise to effects in the United States—the Supreme 
Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not reach this claim.  Speaking for the 
Court, Justice Holmes proclaimed that “the general and almost universal rule is that 
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law 
of the country where the act is done.”17  A contrary result, the Court declared, “not 
only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another 
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations.”18  Discerning congressional intent 
regarding the scope of the Sherman Act, the Court stated that  
any statute [is] intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial 
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power . . . .  [I]t is 
entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within 
the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned.19 
Over the following decades, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause generally gave it an increasingly expansive reach.20  That same 
expansion was reflected in decisions on the reach of the antitrust laws to certain 
intra-state activities.21  And there were a number of post-American Banana 
decisions by the Supreme Court, expanding the application of American antitrust 
laws to behavior that occurred in part in the United States but that also involved 
                                                                                                     
 16. This particular claim also asserted cooperation in that seizure by Costa Rican government 
authorities. 
 17. Id. at 356. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 357.  Because the complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s harm was the result of the acts of 
the governments of Panama and Costa Rica, but done pursuant to the defendant’s intervention, the 
plaintiff’s claims also implicated the “act of state” doctrine.  The breadth of this defense to antitrust 
actions for conduct occurring outside the United States is beyond the scope of this article. 
 20. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding authority of Congress to regulate 
production of wheat used by a farmer for his own needs because those intrastate activities had an effect 
on interstate commerce).  But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__ 132 S.Ct. 2566 
(2012) (concluding that the individual mandate component of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act was not a valid exercise of Congress’ power under Commerce Clause). 
 21. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328 n.7 (1991) (holding that the 
Sherman Act was intended to “go as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go,” and that it 
extended to a hospital’s revocation of staff privileges of an individual physician); McLain v. Real Estate 
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (reiterating that the Commerce Clause also reaches 
conduct which affects interstate commerce, and holding that the Sherman Act extended to alleged 
conspiracy to fix real estate commission rates); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) 
(extending the Sherman Act to minimum fee schedules for title examinations performed by attorneys; 
although legal services were local, the funds to purchase real estate and the buyers of real estate often 
crossed state lines). 
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foreign conduct.22 
Gradually, courts exercised antitrust jurisdiction over certain forms of purely 
extra-territorial activities, which had effects on competition in the United States.  
Before considering the changes wrought by FTAIA, three cases addressing such 
behavior deserve particular attention.  They include two courts of appeals 
decisions—the Second Circuit’s “intent/effects” approach in Alcoa23 and the Ninth 
Circuit’s notably different approach in Timberlane24—and the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Hartford Fire.25 
Alcoa is the well-known decision authored by Judge Learned Hand.  There, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the defendant’s intentional actions, to allow it to 
retain its decades-long position as the sole domestic manufacturer of aluminum 
ingot from bauxite ore,26 supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of 
monopolization, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.  But Alcoa is also a 
landmark case on the extra-territorial application of the antitrust laws. 
In addition to its action against the principal defendant, the government had 
also named Aluminum Limited, Alcoa’s Canadian subsidiary, as a defendant.  One 
issue was whether the Sherman Act extended to Aluminum Limited’s acts outside 
the United States, which had effects on competition and the price of aluminum in 
the United States.  Judge Hand distinguished American Banana and asserted that it 
was “settled law” that “any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not 
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within 
its borders which the state reprehends.”27  Then, suggesting a rule which has since 
been widely adopted by subsequent courts, the court of appeals concluded that the 
Sherman Act applied to extra-territorial activities if two conditions were satisfied:  
the activities were intended to have some effect on imports or exports, and the 
“performance [of the agreement] is shown actually to have had some effect upon 
them.”28  Concluding that here, both of these two conditions were present, the court 
declined to decide the applicability of the Sherman Act if only one of them was 
shown.29 
In Timberlane, the plaintiffs alleged a complicated scheme involving an 
American bank, its subsidiary, which had an office in Honduras, and a number of 
                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (applying the Sherman Act to an 
alleged conspiracy carried out in part in the U.S. but implemented through actions of Mexican officials, 
which affected the prices of rope fiber in the United States); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) 
(applying the Sherman Act to claims against agents of foreign shipping lines based on agreements made 
in London to charge discriminatory rates on freight shipped between the United States and a foreign 
country); U.S. v. Pac. & Arctic Ry., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (applying the Sherman Act to conspiracy to set 
rates on shipments between the United States and Canada, which was effectuated in part by control of 
wharves located in the United States). 
 23. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (U.S. v. Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 24. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 25. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 26. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423-25. There were also numerous American suppliers of aluminum ingot 
from scrap metal or other sources, but the court of appeals held that “virgin aluminum ingot” constituted 
the relevant product market. Id.   
 27. Id. at 443. 
 28. Id. at 444.  The court relied in part for its conclusion on the Supreme Court decisions cited 
supra note 20. 
 29. Id. at 443-44. 
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individuals and corporations—some American, some Honduran—to reduce the 
supply of lumber in Honduras, which the plaintiffs would have been able to 
purchase there and then to import to the United States.  The bulk of the defendants’ 
activities took place in Honduras, and the principal effect was also felt in that 
country.30  The district court, applying a version of Alcoa’s “effects” test, had 
dismissed the action, having concluded that the defendants’ conduct did not have 
the requisite “direct and substantial” effect on U.S. foreign commerce. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected that conclusion, holding that a judicial focus solely 
on the substantiality of the domestic effect of a defendant’s extra-territorial 
conduct, with little or no attention to other considerations, including the degree of 
comity owed based on the interests of the parties and the countries involved, was 
“costly” and “risky.”31  Instead, the court suggested a three-step approach,32 which 
in turn would require weighing a long list of factors to determine the applicability 
of the Sherman Act to the challenged conduct.33  While this far more nuanced 
approach had the potential virtue of increasing the likelihood of reaching a 
“correct” result, it was criticized by numerous courts and commentators for the 
increased burden it placed on courts and parties, as well as the uncertainty of result 
it presaged.34 
Hartford Fire involved an alleged conspiracy by American insurance and 
reinsurance companies, and reinsurers based in London, to change the terms of 
commercial general liability insurance policies for risks in the United States.  
Those non-American insurers did not engage in conduct in the United States, but 
                                                                                                     
 30. Some of the activities included resort to Honduran courts and involvement by Honduran 
government officials.  The court of appeals rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
foreclosed by the “act of state” doctrine.  Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605-08. 
 31. Id. at 612. 
 32. Id. at 613.   
A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated . . . .  [T]he antitrust laws require in the first instance that 
there be some effect—actual or intended—on American foreign commerce before the federal courts may 
legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes.  Second, a greater showing of 
burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a 
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws . . . .  Third, there 
is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of the interests of, and links to, the 
United States—including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce—are sufficiently 
strong, vis-á-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.   
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 33. Id. at 614.   
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or 
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to 
which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of 
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit 
purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative 
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.    
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 34. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (concluding that Timberlane factors “are not useful in resolving the controversy”): Nat’l 
Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Timberlane test); 
Lionel Kestenbaum, Antitrust’s “Extraterritorial” Jurisdiction:  A Progress Report on the Balancing of 
Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT’L L. 311 (1982).  But see Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817-19 (Souter, J. 
dissenting) (citing with approval to Timberlane and its multi-factor approach). 
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the effects of their conduct were felt here.  The case presented two separate 
questions:  whether the defendants’ conduct was immunized by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,35 and “whether certain claims against the London reinsurers should 
have been dismissed as improper applications of the Sherman Act to foreign 
conduct.”36 
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Souter, writing for the Court,37 concluded that the 
district court “undoubtedly had jurisdiction of these Sherman Act claims.”38  The 
Court noted that it had long ago rejected the limited approach of American 
Banana.39  Citing to Alcoa, Justice Souter stated that “it is well established by now 
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did 
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”40 
Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s conclusion that the Sherman Act 
applied to these defendants.41  He acknowledged that “it is now well established 
that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.”42  He also agreed that federal 
courts had “jurisdiction” over these claims, given the fact that the antitrust laws fell 
within the power of Congress to legislate with respect to commerce with foreign 
nations.  But, for the dissent, “the question . . . is whether, and to what extent, 
Congress has exercised that undoubted legislative jurisdiction in enacting the 
Sherman Act.”43  Justice Scalia found the answer in a canon of construction, that 
“an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”44  Drawing on principles of customary 
international law, and in particular the comity owed by one country to the interests 
of other countries, Justice Scalia concluded that the exercise of legislative 
                                                                                                     
 35. 59 Stat. 33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (2006)).  The  McCarran-Ferguson Act provides an 
immunity from the antitrust laws for “the business of insurance.”  However, that exemption is lost if the 
defendants’ behavior constitutes a “boycott.”  Id. § 1013(b).  The Court concluded that the Act did not 
foreclose scrutiny of this conduct, since at least some of the plaintiffs’ allegations complained of 
“boycotts.” 
 36. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 794-95. 
 37. Justice Souter was joined in this part of the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White, Blackmun and Stevens. 
 38. Id. at 795. 
 39. Id. at 795-96.  In addition to several earlier cases in which the Supreme Court had distinguished 
American Banana, see supra note 22, more recent case law had also indicated that that decision was of 
limited precedential value.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 
n.6 (1986) (“The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has 
an effect on American commerce.”) (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 
690, 704-05 (1962)). 
 40. 509 U.S. at 796.  The Court asserted that the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfied this standard.  Id.  
“Such is the conduct alleged here:  that the London reinsurers engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect 
the market for insurance in the United States and that their conduct in fact produced substantial effect.”  
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 438-40 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that the court has jurisdiction under Sherman Act for claims involving foreign conduct 
which has domestic effects; relying on Hartford Fire and Alcoa). 
 41. He was joined in this dissent by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
 42. 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 44. Id. at 814-15 (quoting  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)). 
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jurisdiction here was unwarranted.45 
II. 
In addition to these three cases, over the years, numerous other courts have 
also struggled to create a framework for analyzing the international reach of the 
antitrust laws.  As the legislative history of the FTAIA reflects,46 prior to its 
enactment, there was considerable uncertainty regarding that question.47  The 
FTAIA was a congressional attempt to state clear rules for identifying the 
applicability of the antitrust laws to certain foreign activities. 
Yet, despite the passage of the FTAIA, the uncertainty persists today, and the 
controversy about the appropriate scope of the antitrust laws has not ended.  The 
primary difficulty in discerning the scope of these limitations is the “rather 
convoluted language” of the statute.48  It provides as follows:   
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other 
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless—  
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect— 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign 
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of the [Sherman Act], 
other than this section.49 
Now, to try to parse this statutory monstrosity.  What is the effect of the 
enactment of the FTAIA on the application of the Sherman Act to extra-territorial 
behavior? 
First, what is clear.  The FTAIA seeks to identify situations to which the 
American antitrust laws are inapplicable.  The “other than import trade or import 
commerce” language, inserted parenthetically in the initial portion of the Act, sets 
forth the one straightforward situation involving international trade that is outside 
of the FTAIA.  This phrase makes clear that the FTAIA simply does not apply to, 
and thus the Sherman Act is fully applicable to, importation activities.50 
                                                                                                     
 45. “I think it unimaginable that an assertion of legislative jurisdiction by the United States would 
be considered reasonable . . . .”  509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 46. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Even among 
American courts and commentators, however, there is no consensus on how far the jurisdiction should 
extend.”) (discussing conflicting case law and commentary). 
 48. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing the statute as 
“inelegantly phrased”). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 50. See, e.g., Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 438 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
FTAIA clearly permits antitrust actions for claims challenging foreign price-fixing conspiracy on goods 
exported to the United States); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 738 F. Supp.2d 1011, 
1022-23 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (upholding jurisdiction over claims for products sold or distributed in the 
United States, either directly or through subsidiaries or affiliated companies).  See also Fond du Lac 
Bumper Exch. v. Jui Li Enter. Co., 795 F. Supp.2d 847 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (holding that FTAIA does not 
bar a class action complaining of conspiracy to fix prices and limit output of auto parts; although 
passage of title to goods occurred in Taiwan, defendants knew they would be imported into the United 
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What about other “foreign commerce”?51  Does the FTAIA limit the 
application of the Sherman Act to exports from the United States?  Does it bar 
antitrust claims for activities which neither originate in, nor terminate in, the United 
States?  What different treatment is there for activities involving goods or 
commodities, as compared to services, financial transactions and the like?  The 
balance of this article seeks to answer these questions, and more importantly, to 
criticize some of the answers that some courts have given. 
III. 
The Supreme Court has not been particularly helpful in resolving interpretive 
questions.   Hartford Fire52 was the first post-FTAIA case to address the extra-
territorial reach of the antitrust laws.53  But, although that case was decided more 
than a decade after the enactment of the FTAIA, Justice Souter’s opinion there only 
made passing reference to that statute.54  Indeed, the Court expressed doubt, 
without any further explanation, whether FTAIA even applied to the case.55  The 
Hartford Fire Court also expressed uncertainty, without feeling a need to resolve 
the question, “whether the Act’s ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it.”56  And, on a key issue 
that divided the majority and the dissent that was authored by Justice Scalia—the 
extent to which the doctrine of comity would counsel an American court to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign defendants57—Justice Souter once again 
found no guidance from the FTAIA.58 
By contrast, Empagran addressed one of the important interpretative issues 
                                                                                                     
States either by plaintiffs or by third parties); Precision Assocs., Inc. v. Panalpina World Transp. 
(Holding) Ltd., No. 08-CV-42, 2011 WL 7053807, at *35-36 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2011) (holding that 
“import commerce” included price-fixing by freight-forwarders, on cost for shipping goods from foreign 
locations into the United States). 
 51. The second, and more convoluted, exception applies where the commerce in question has a 
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce and where that effect 
gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.  See Empagran, infra, note 59 and accompanying text. 
 52. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (discussed supra notes 36-45 and 
accompanying text). 
 53. Empagran, which by contrast dealt in depth with the FTAIA, is discussed below.  See infra 
notes 59-73 and accompanying text. 
 54. Justice Scalia’s dissent did not even take note of FTAIA or its implications for the case. 
 55. “[I]t is unclear how [FTAIA] might apply to the conduct alleged here . . . .  Assuming that 
FTAIA’s standard affects this litigation . . . the conduct alleged plainly meets its requirements.”  509 
U.S. at 796 n.23.  Why?  How?  The Court was silent. 
 56. Id.  Compare U.S. v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
FTAIA’s requirement of “direct” effect in the U.S. cut back on the Alcoa test for reach of the Sherman 
Act), with id. at 684 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the new statute merely codified existing 
antitrust law in the use of the word ‘direct.’”) and Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 389-
90, 399-401 (2d Cir. 2002) (FTAIA “does not alter” pre-existing standards for extra-territorial reach of 
antitrust laws). 
 57. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
 58. “When it enacted the FTAIA, . . . Congress expressed no view on the question whether a court 
with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of 
international comity . . . .  We need not decide that question here, however . . . [because] international 
comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here.”  Hartford 
Fire, 509 U.S. at 798. 
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under the FTAIA:  Does the Sherman Act continue to apply when the defendant’s 
activity under attack involves “(1) significant foreign anticompetitive conduct with 
(2) an adverse domestic effect and (3) an independent foreign effect giving rise to 
the claim[?]”59  The Court in Empagran began by restating the second “exception” 
to the FTAIA, in addition to the “import trade or import commerce” exception.  
The Sherman Act continues to apply where the commerce in question has a “direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce and where 
that effect gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.60 
Empagran’s restatement of this statutory language does provide a few clear 
rules.  The antitrust laws do not apply to anticompetitive activities where the harm 
is felt solely outside the United States.61  Thus, they do not apply either to “export 
activities” or to “other commercial activities taking place abroad, unless those 
activities adversely affect domestic commerce, imports to the United States, or 
exporting activities of one engaged in such activities within the United States.”62  
But the imprecision of the extent of the second exception—the “unless” clause—
still leaves numerous unanswered questions. 
Empagran involved an alleged worldwide conspiracy to fix the prices of 
vitamins.  Some of the manufacturers and distributors were American, and some 
were foreign.  Some of the purchasers affected by the price-fixing cartel were 
American, and some were foreign.  But the focus of this appeal was on foreign 
purchasers who did not purchase any vitamins in the United States.63  Critically, the 
Court accepted the lower court’s assumption64 that the “foreign effect”—i.e., the 
higher prices paid by the foreign plaintiffs—was independent of any domestic 
effect—i.e., the higher prices paid by American purchasers.65 
The Court identified two reasons for finding the Sherman Act inapplicable to 
the foreign purchasers’ claims:  history and comity.  The FTAIA sought to clarify 
and limit the extraterritorial scope of the antitrust laws.  But it certainly did not 
                                                                                                     
 59. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
 60. Id. 
 61. “[T]he Sherman Act does not prevent [American exporters] from entering into business 
arrangements (say, joint selling arrangements), however anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements 
adversely affect only foreign markets.”  Id. at 161.  This conclusion is consistent with the primary 
purpose given for the enactment of FTAIA—the removal of “barrier[s] to join export activities.”  See 
supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 62. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 161 (emphasis in original).  The “other commercial activities” would 
encompass transactions solely within, between, or among foreign countries. 
 63. The court of appeals had concluded that these purchases, as part of a global price-fixing 
conspiracy, were within the “exception” to the FTAIA.  F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  In addition to overruling that decision, the Court also abrogated a 
Second Circuit decision that had reached a similar result.  Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 
395-96 (2d Cir. 2002),.  After Empagran, Transnor (Bermuda) Limited v. BP North America Petroleum, 
666 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)—which held that a foreign corporation which allegedly suffered 
injury on a contract made for, and calling for delivery of, petroleum outside of the United States could 
maintain an antitrust action because two of the three principal trading centers for that oil were in the 
United States—is probably of little precedential value. 
 64. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160. 
 65. “[W]e base our decision upon the following:  The price-fixing conduct significantly and 
adversely affects both customers outside the United States and customers within the United States, but 
the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect.”  Id. at 164. 
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seek to expand their reach.  And the prevailing state of the law in 1982 would have 
foreclosed the assertion of that kind of antitrust claim.66 
Considerations of comity were even more important.  There is a strong 
presumption that federal statutes are to be construed to avoid interference with the 
sovereign interests of other nations.67  That presumption may be overcome when 
the foreign activity impacts American consumers and other domestic interests.  
But, in light of the assumption that here the foreign harm was independent of any 
domestic impact, recognition of the superior interests of other countries68 and the 
extent to which imposition of liability and remedies would be inconsistent with 
their legal norms, dictated a refusal to extend the Sherman Act to those claims.69 
All well and good, if there truly was no domestic harm from the defendant’s 
behavior.70  There must be some “domestic effect” of the antitrust violation71 to 
avoid the bar of FTAIA.72  The United States might view the defendants’ conduct 
                                                                                                     
 66. “[W]e have found no significant indication that at the time Congress wrote this statute courts 
would have thought the Sherman Act applicable in these circumstances.”  Id. at 169. 
 67. Id. at 164.  This approach echoes the canon of construction invoked by Justice Scalia in dissent 
in Hartford Fire.  See supra notes 44 and accompanying text. 
 68. The strength of those interests, and the American sensitivity to those interests, was demonstrated 
in part by appearances as amici curiae by the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of 
Canada, and by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, all arguing for 
inapplicability of the American antitrust laws. 
 69. Id. at 165 (finding that justification for “interference with a foreign nation’s ability 
independently to regulate its own commercial affairs” was “insubstantial”). 
 70. See Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing a 
challenge to alleged worldwide price-fixing and market division agreements, entered into by an 
American defendant-manufacturer on products manufactured and sold in Europe, where the plaintiff 
alleged “spillover effect on domestic commerce”); see also United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. 
Co., 131 F. Supp.2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“The FTAIA explicitly bars antitrust actions alleging 
restraints in foreign markets for inputs . . . that are used abroad to manufacture downstream products . . . 
that may later be imported into the United States.”), aff’d on other grounds, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 
2002)(en banc). 
 71. See  Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002) (“it is the effect and not 
the location of the conduct that determines whether the antitrust laws apply; United Phosphorus, 131 F. 
Supp.2d at 1009 (“conduct on American soil is not always sufficient to prove effect on domestic 
commerce because it is the situs of the effect, not the conduct, which is crucial”), aff’d on other 
grounds, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. 
Supp. 920, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that FTAIA barred claim for harm suffered by plaintiff 
outside the United States; “[i]t matters not if there was anti-competitive conduct in the United States or 
by domestic corporations.”). 
 72. For example, in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 
2001), a Norwegian oil corporation that conducted business solely in Europe complained that the 
defendants’ worldwide bid-rigging and market division agreements for barge services had inflated its 
operating costs in the North Sea.  Although those agreements also affected the prices that other oil 
companies paid for similar services in the Gulf of Mexico, the court of appeals found that FTAIA barred 
the plaintiff’s claim.  The existence of an alleged single, unified global conspiracy, and of a “close 
relationship” between the domestic injury and the plaintiff’s claim, was insufficient when, as here, the 
domestic harm to others which flowed from the antitrust violations did not “give rise to” the foreign 
injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff.   
  Similarly, in In re Copper Antitrust Litigation, 117 F. Supp.2d 875 (W.D. Wis. 2000), the 
plaintiffs, who were German purchasers of copper, asserted that the defendants had engaged in a 
worldwide price fixing conspiracy.  They alleged that the defendants had tampered with prices on the 
London Metal Exchange; as a result, copper prices throughout the world were artificially inflated.  
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as highly problematic, but America has at most only an altruistic interest in having 
its antitrust statutes apply to all anticompetitive behavior everywhere in the world, 
while other countries have real interests at stake.73 
However, in the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs also challenged the assumption 
that the behavior truly was “independent.”  Rather, they asserted that even the 
portion of the price-fixing conspiracy addressed at foreign purchasers did harm 
American interests.  The Court remanded on this point, to allow a determination of 
the relationship between those harms and, if so, whether this would fall within the 
second exception to FTAIA. 
Since Empagran, lower courts have considered a variety of interpretative 
questions under the FTAIA.  One is the question that was left for consideration on 
remand:  whether there is the requisite domestic harm if the sellers could not have 
maintained their international price-fixing arrangement “but for” some adverse 
domestic effect. 
Regrettably, several courts have rejected that assertion.  Application of the 
American antitrust laws is withheld, even where the foreign conduct results in a 
spillover effect in the United States, or when U.S. consumers are harmed by extra-
territorial behavior.  The result has been to deny fuller protection to American 
consumers from antitrust violations that take place on a worldwide basis. 
The most notable decision to reject the “but for” argument was the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion on remand in Empagran.74  The plaintiffs contended that in the 
challenged worldwide price-fixing conspiracy, involving products which were 
fungible, the defendants were only able to maintain their super-competitive prices 
outside the United States by inflating prices within the United States as well.  
Otherwise, domestic purchasers would have been able to act as arbitrageur-
exporters, underselling the cartel’s elevated foreign prices.75 
The court of appeals recognized that the plaintiffs had painted a “plausible 
scenario under which maintaining super-competitive prices in the United States 
                                                                                                     
Although the effect of this conduct may indeed have been felt in the United States by American 
consumers, the plaintiffs’ particular harm—distortion of the prices on copper and copper futures they 
had purchased and resold in Europe—was not the result of the illegal behavior.  Thus, the court 
concluded that the action was barred by FTAIA, holding that “the Sherman Act claim that a plaintiff 
alleges and the Sherman Act claim that arises out of the effect on an American market must be the 
same.”  Id. at 883; see also Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
FTAIA bars an American consumer’s claim challenging the alleged conspiracy by European banks to 
inflate fees to exchange Euro-zone currencies in Europe; dismissing action, after Supreme Court’s 
remand to reconsider earlier decision in light of Empagran); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 
802, 813-15 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that FTAIA barred action arising out of the termination of an 
agreement appointing American plaintiff as exclusive distributor of defendant’s products in Asia and 
Africa). 
 73. See generally Eric Taffet, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s Domestic Injury 
Exception:  A Nullity for Private Foreign Plaintiffs Seeking Access to American Courts, 50 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 216, 218 (2011) (arguing that the consequence of the Empagran decision “that no 
foreign private antitrust plaintiff can establish jurisdiction of an American court based on the domestic 
injury exception . . . is supported by sound policy justifications”). 
 74. Empagran S.A. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter 
Empagran II]. 
 75. Id. at 1270. 
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might well have been a ‘but-for’ cause of the [plaintiffs’] foreign injury.”76  But the 
court held that this was not enough.  The court insisted on a showing of a “direct 
causal relationship” to the domestic injury, i.e., a showing of “proximate 
causation.”  Echoing the Supreme Court’s concerns for so-called “prescriptive 
comity,”77 the D.C. Circuit insisted that “a more flexible, less direct standard than 
proximate causation would open the door to just such interference with other 
nations’ prerogative to safeguard their own citizens from anti-competitive activity 
within their own borders.”78 
Subsequently, a number of other courts have likewise held that this “but-for” 
relationship is insufficient to bring the conduct within the exception to the FTAIA 
for foreign activities which have a domestic effect.  Like the D.C. Circuit in 
Empagran II, they have insisted that the FTAIA bars an antitrust claim unless the 
domestic harm is the “direct” result of the foreign behavior. 
For example, in a challenge to a global price-fixing conspiracy involving the 
food additive monosodium glutamate (MSG),79 the plaintiffs had argued that but 
for the higher prices set by the defendants in the United States, they would have 
been able to purchase MSG either directly from the United States or from 
arbitrageurs selling MSG imported from the United States.  The Eighth Circuit 
upheld the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that “the statutory ‘gives rise to’ 
language requires a direct and proximate causal relationship.”80  The Ninth Circuit 
also rejected a claim premised on a similar “but for” theory by a foreign purchaser 
who complained of the elevated prices it paid as a result of a global price-fixing 
conspiracy involving computer components.81  And a district court rejected a claim 
that the defendant’s manipulation of sales of wheat in Iraq were part of a global 
conspiracy which eventually led to lower prices that American farmers received 
from their wheat.82 
Another interpretive question is whether FTAIA bars an action for foreign 
injury, if the same conduct—an alleged worldwide antitrust conspiracy—gives rise 
to both domestic harm and the foreign injury, but where the domestic effects of the 
violation—paying inflated prices—do not “give rise to” that latter injury.  Although 
                                                                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-69 (discussed supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text). 
 78. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
 79. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 537-40 (8th Cir. 2007) (following 
Empagran II). 
 80. Id. at 538.  See also Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., No. 03 Civ. 
10312(HBDF), 2005 WL 2207017, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (rejecting assertion that domestic 
effects of global price-fixing conspiracy for various chemicals “gave rise to” foreign plaintiffs’ antitrust 
injuries; “but-for” causation is insufficient).   
 81. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 985-90 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (following Empagran II and Monosodium Glutamate); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone 
Lorraine, S.A., 500 F. Supp.2d 437, 442-47 (D.N.J. 2007) (following Empagran II).  Cf. In re Urethane 
Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 575 (D. Kan. 2009) (‘[N]othing in the FTAIA or Empagran precludes 
discovery of documents or information related to foreign commerce that are relevant to antitrust claims 
alleging a domestic injury.”) (footnote omitted). 
 82. Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp.2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“although plaintiffs may have 
alleged a plausible theory of causation based on the global interrelatedness of the wheat markets in Iraq 
and the United States, [defendant’s] extraterritorial conduct in Iraq was, at most, only a ‘but for’ cause 
of the alleged drop in wheat prices in the United States”). 
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the text of FTAIA merely speaks in terms of limitations on claims for foreign 
“conduct,” courts have concluded that the existence of domestic harm will not 
serve as a hook to permit assertion of claims for the foreign injury.83 
Some courts have properly rejected defendants’ contentions that the plaintiff’s 
foreign injury, in particular paying higher prices abroad, was not the proximate 
result of the domestic effect of the price-fixing conspiracy.  For example, in In re 
TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation,84 an American company, purchasing 
components for its own use both in the United States and abroad, had engaged in 
negotiations with the defendants in the United States to set a single, world-wide 
price for the products in question.  Because of this direct linkage between the 
artificially inflated price schedule and the prices actually paid by the plaintiff’s 
foreign affiliates, the district court distinguished the arbitrage theory asserted, but 
rejected, in the Empagran II line of cases and concluded that the “domestic effects” 
exception to FTAIA was satisfied by plaintiffs’ allegations.85  In a subsequent 
opinion in the same case,86 the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
domestic effect was not “direct,” even with respect to transactions involving 
several steps between the foreign manufacture and sale of the products and their 
subsequent importation into and sale in the United States.87 
The narrow approach taken by Empagran II and cases relying on its analysis to 
the FTAIA’s exception for behavior causing adverse domestic effects is 
unreasonably constrained and short-sighted.  These decisions effectively ignore the 
very real injury—the spillover effect—that Americans incur from this behavior.  
And this result is hardly dictated by the language of the Act.  The Supreme Court in 
Empagran had indeed relied on comity to support its result.  But it emphasized that 
this comity—which is analogous to the balancing of interests undertaken in a 
conflicts of law analysis—was particularly appropriate when there was no domestic 
harm from the behavior in question.88  However, where the D.C. Circuit and other 
courts have acknowledged that the defendants’ behavior necessarily had a domestic 
impact, even if one that was arguably only “indirect,” the comity analysis differs 
substantially.  Under those circumstances, an American court should be far less 
reluctant to apply American law to protect American interests. 
A different interpretative aspect of the “domestic effects” exception has given 
                                                                                                     
 83. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp.2d 777, 781-86 (N.D. Cal. 2007);  Emerson 
Elec. Co., 500 F. Supp.2d at 446-47;  In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp.2d 
555, 562 (D. Del. 2006).  See also Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 608 F.Supp.2d 
1166, 1182-90 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing claims on behalf of plaintiff’s foreign subsidiaries, for 
foreign purchases made as part of alleged global price-fixing conspiracy; rejecting plaintiff’s arguments 
based on single entity and agency theories). 
 84. .  781 F. Supp.2d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 85. Id. at 959-64.  That district court reached similar conclusions in a parallel action brought by 
another plaintiff.  See in re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 785 F. Supp.2d 835, 840-44 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 86. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp.2d 953, 959-68 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 87. “The increased price of the components caused the prices of the finished products in the United 
States to increase.  If this effect is not ‘direct,’ it is difficult to imagine what would be.”  Id. at 966. 
 88. “[O]ur courts have long held that application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive 
conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar 
as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive 
conduct has caused.”  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165 (emphasis in original). 
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rise to yet another unfortunate expansion of the FTAIA.  Recall that the Sherman 
Act continues to apply when the commerce in question has a “direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce and where that effect 
gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.89  Does the exception apply when, because there 
is an alleged conspiracy to fix prices both in the United States and abroad, the 
defendant’s conduct caused a domestic effect, and at the same time that effect 
proximately caused antitrust injury outside the United States?  Or must there first 
be a domestic effect, and then a subsequent non-domestic injury?  In a recent 
case,90 a district court concluded “that FTAIA imposes a two-step dance.”91  The 
existence of a simultaneous domestic effect and a foreign injury was insufficient to 
state a Sherman Act claim.92 
Another group of decisions is even more problematic.  In these cases, although 
the alleged anti-competitive behavior occurred outside the United States, the harm 
undoubtedly was inflicted on American consumers.  Indeed, in several of those 
cases, at least some portions of the transaction itself occurred in the United States.  
Nonetheless, in these cases, courts have concluded that FTAIA still bars an 
antitrust action. 
The Minn-Chem decision by a panel of the Seventh Circuit—which was 
properly overturned by that court in an en banc decision—is the most recent and 
most prominent illustration of the serious judicial misreadings given to FTAIA.93  
However, had that original decision not been set aside, it would have been yet one 
more instance of the serious erosion of protection that can, and should, be afforded 
to American consumers by the antitrust laws. 
The plaintiffs complained of a broad price-fixing conspiracy in the potash 
market.  The defendants were non-American companies engaged in mining potash, 
which is a mineral primarily used as an agricultural fertilizer, in Canada, Russia 
and Belarus.  Together, the defendants accounted for over two-thirds of the world’s 
                                                                                                     
 89. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 90. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 702 F. Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 91. Id. at 551.  “We hold that under FTAIA the domestic effects must occur first and then 
proximately cause the foreign antitrust claim.”  Id. 
 92. The plaintiffs had made purchases both in the United States and abroad of products sold 
pursuant to an alleged price-fixing conspiracy.  Id. at 550.  The portion of the action under scrutiny 
sought damages for their purchases outside the United States.  Id.  For the purposes of resolving the 
scope of this exception to FTAIA, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ assertions that the defendants had 
agreed, in part by meetings that took place in the United States, to elevated prices for the products in 
question; and that the agreement resulted in a single unified price for the sales in both the United States 
and Europe.  Id. at 554.  Thus, there was no question that there was the requisite “domestic effect.”  Id.  
At issue, however, was whether that effect satisfied the “gives rise” portion of the exception.  Id. 
In insisting that the domestic effect and the foreign injury be sequential rather than simultaneous, the 
court relied on Empagran II’s rejection of a “but for” scenario and its imposition of a “proximate cause” 
requirement.  Id. at 555-61.   The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that this standard should not 
apply when, as here, the domestic and foreign prices, and the injuries they caused, were interdependent 
rather than independent.  Id.  Instead, the court concluded that a simultaneous foreign injury could not 
be the “proximate” result of the domestic effect, maintaining that even “a direct correlation between 
prices does not establish a sufficient causal relationship.”  Id. at 560 (quoting In re DRAM Antitrust 
Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 93. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2011), set aside after reh’g en banc, 
683 F.3d. 845 (2012). 
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potash supply.  The plaintiffs represented classes of American purchasers of potash 
who imported it, both directly and indirectly, into the United States. 
The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to set the sales prices 
and output levels of potash in China, Brazil and India; that those prices served as 
“benchmarks” for American potash prices; and that this behavior resulted in the 
higher prices they paid for potash in the United States.  Yet remarkably, the 
original Seventh Circuit panel held that these claims were barred by the FTAIA.  
First, it concluded that “it is not enough that the defendants are engaged in the U.S. 
import market.”94  Rather, it held that FTAIA’s “import commerce” provision95 
applies only “if the overseas anticompetitive conduct actually ‘involves’ the U.S. 
import market.”96  In the panel’s view, this in turn required that the specific 
conduct, here the agreement to fix prices, must “target” U.S. import goods.97 
Then, in the panel’s view, it was not enough that the plaintiffs alleged that the 
prices they paid were elevated, and that this was the known and intended result of 
their behavior.98  Rather, the plaintiffs had to plead facts, showing that the effect on 
the domestic potash industry was the “direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable” result of the foreign anticompetitive activity.  The various allegations 
in the complaint about the relationship between the price increases and output 
restrictions in China, Brazil and India, and the sharply elevated prices the plaintiffs 
paid in the United States, were dismissed as conclusory or inadequate. 
In part, the defendant-oriented tilt reflected in that decision is yet another 
illustration of the serious mischief wrought by Twombly and its progeny.99  The 
insistence on detailed allegations of fact makes it far more difficult for plaintiffs, 
who have not yet had the benefit of any pre-trial discovery, to state a claim which 
will satisfy these elevated standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.100 
However, that decision was also reflective of the substantive shift away from 
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws and towards greater permissiveness of 
defendants’ anticompetitive behavior, which was described at the outset of this 
article.101  But the expansion of FTAIA in a situation like the one presented by 
Minn-Chem would have had a particularly invidious result.  Nonsensically, the 
court exempted Canadian, Russian and Belarus producers from antitrust scrutiny, 
even when their conduct harmed American importers, American farmers and 
American consumers. 
In notable contrast, the en banc panel refused to permit the defendants to 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 661. 
 95. Recall that this “exception” to FTAIA—more accurately, a provision dictating that the FTAIA 
never reaches “import commerce”—permits the assertion of an antitrust claim. 
 96. Minn-Chem, 657 F.3d at 661 (emphasis in original). 
 97. Id. 
 98. As the court noted, “[f]rom 2003 to 2008, potash prices in the United States increased by a 
staggering amount—roughly 600%.”  Id. at 654. 
 99. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  See generally Max Huffman, New Lessons for Pleading the FTAIA, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Nov. 2011) (stating that the court in Minn-Chem “may have been overly 
skeptical in its review of the complaint,” and concluding that “[c]ombining [FTAIA] with a pleading 
standard created to protect against false positive errors from private antitrust enforcement substantially 
increases the challenge to private plaintiffs.”). 
 101. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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invoke FTAIA as a shield from potential antitrust liability.  As to some of the 
charged conduct, the result was straightforward.  Some of the allegedly inflated 
prices were for large quantities of potash shipped directly to the United States.  
These transactions were part of “import trade,” and thus were clearly outside of the 
FTAIA’s coverage.102  Rejecting any suggestions of “targeting,”103 the court 
succinctly concluded that “transactions that are directly between the plaintiff 
purchasers and the defendant cartel members are the import commerce of the 
United States in this sector.”104 
Closer examination was required of some of the allegations regarding the 
defendants’ global price-fixing conspiracy, and the plaintiffs’ contention that the 
elevated prices charged in the United States were the result of the defendants’ use 
of prices set on foreign sales as a “benchmark.”  Since arguably some of those 
transactions involved potash that was not imported directly into the United States, 
they were not part of “import trade” or “import commerce.”  Therefore, it became 
necessary to consider the requirement for an exception to FTAIA—that the foreign 
conduct have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic 
commerce.  The latter two requirements were easily met: The trade involved ran 
into the billions of dollars, the price of potash rose 600%, and the defendants 
certainly could have foreseen that their price strategy would affect the prices paid 
by American consumers.105 
But was the effect of this conduct “direct”?  Here, the court rejected the more 
demanding standard suggested by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL 
Biotechnologies, which required that the domestic effect be the “immediate 
consequence” of the defendants’ illegal conduct.106  Instead, the Seventh Circuit 
correctly held that the element only required proof that the prohibited effect on 
domestic competition was the “proximate result” of the unlawful behavior.107  And 
here, since the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged the requisite domestic effect, 
it was error to dismiss the action. 
This decision marks a healthy re-direction of FTAIA’s exclusion of actions 
challenging foreign behavior, even when it does not directly involve import 
commerce.  The antitrust laws still apply when that behavior impacts domestic 
commerce and harms domestic consumers.  Despite fears of potential over-
                                                                                                     
 102. As the court explained, “the applicability of U.S. law to transactions in which a good or service 
is being sent directly into the United States, with no intermediate stops, is both fully predictable to 
foreign entities and necessary for the protection of U.S. consumers.”  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854. 
 103. Regrettably, other cases have also insisted on proof that the defendants’ conduct “targeted” the 
United States or U.S. imports.  See, e.g., McLafferty v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., No. 08-1706, 2009 
WL 3365881 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009) (discussed infra notes 109, 118 and accompanying text).  
However, as the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded, the proper reading of FTAIA only requires that 
the defendants’ conduct have the requisite “effect” on either U.S. domestic commerce or U.S. import 
commerce—irrespective of the defendants’ intent.  Thus, the test is “objective,” looking at the actual 
effect, rather than adding some “subjective” requirement. 
 104. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 855 (emphasis in original).  
 105. Id. at 856. 
 106. 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 107. “The word ‘direct’ addresses the classic concern about remoteness . . . .  [T]he FTAIA 
exclude[s] from the Sherman Act foreign activities that are too remote from the ultimate effects on U.S. 
domestic or import commerce.”  Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857. 
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application of the Sherman Act, as the Seventh Circuit noted, plaintiffs still have to 
meet the Alcoa/Hartford Fire standard for the extra-territorial application of the 
antitrust laws—“that the conduct of the foreign cartel members (1) was meant to 
produce and (2) did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”108 
Although the expansive misinterpretation of the FTAIA’s exclusions was 
properly corrected by the full Seventh Circuit, a slightly older pair of decisions 
involving international air travel by Americans, affords other instances of the 
overbroad judicial interpretation of FTAIA.  In McLafferty,109 the plaintiff sought 
to represent a class of Americans who purchased tickets in the United States from 
several foreign airlines.  She alleged that the defendants had engaged in a price-
fixing conspiracy to elevate the fares for travel between Europe and Japan, 
including flights taken by the plaintiff.  Yet, the court found that the alleged 
conspiracy did not have the requisite effect on domestic “commerce” to fall within 
the exception in the FTAIA.  The court stated that its focus was on the “geographic 
target” of the conspiracy.  Then, with little explanation for its conclusion, it 
asserted that “it is apparent that the conspiracy’s target was Europe and Japan and 
passenger travel between the two.”110  In the court’s view, the fact that the claim 
was by American plaintiffs, for purchases made in the United States, was 
insufficient to overcome the FTAIA. 
It should be obvious that this result seriously diminishes the protection that the 
antitrust laws are designed to extend to American consumers.  Furthermore, this 
reading of FTAIA was not necessary to accomplish its goals, including whatever 
comity concerns are suggested by Empagran.  It should hardly be offensive to 
foreign countries for the Sherman Act to extend to sales taking place in the United 
States, even for foreign air travel.  The opportunity afforded to the defendants to 
make sales in the United States and to profit from travel by American consumers 
should carry with it the obligation to adhere to the rules imposed by U.S. antitrust 
law. 
Even more regrettable is another decision also involving alleged price-fixing 
by airlines—both American and foreign—flying international routes.  Unlike 
McLafferty, where the flights neither originated in nor terminated in the United 
States, in In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation,111 
the plaintiffs complained of overcharges on flights from Asia to the United 
States.112  Nonetheless, the court here too held that the claims were barred by 
FTAIA.  It first gave a cramped interpretation to the “import trade” or “import 
commerce” limitation in FTAIA, finding that unlike cargo,113 international air 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 858.  Here, the court concluded that “[t]he inference from [the plaintiffs’] allegations is 
not just plausible but compelling that the cartel meant to, and did in fact, keep prices artificially high in 
the United States.”  Id. at 858-59. 
 109. McLafferty v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., No. 08-1706, 2009 WL 3365881 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 
2009). 
 110. Id. at *4. 
 111. No. C 07–05634 CRB, 2011 WL 1753738 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011). 
 112. The class of plaintiffs was all passengers purchasing overpriced tickets on these flights.  While 
these passengers were not all Americans, undoubtedly a large fraction of them were. 
 113. Thus, the court distinguished In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, No. MD 
06-1775(JG)(VVP), 2008 WL 5958061, at *13-15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (concluding that a 
conspiracy to fix prices of international air cargo transportation “involved” import commerce; “conduct 
22 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1 
passengers were not the subject of “importation.”  Putting aside the fact that the 
airlines presumably also transported the passengers’ luggage,114 this narrow 
definition of “import” is inconsistent with the evolving nature of international 
trade, which is increasingly characterized by the sale of services, intellectual 
property, or other intangibles across national borders, and less by sales of 
traditional “goods.” 
The court also dismissed the second “exception” to FTAIA—for foreign 
conduct having an adverse domestic effect, where “such effect gives rise to the 
[antitrust] claim.”115  The court conceded that the defendants’ overcharges resulted 
in the requisite effect on American consumers.  Yet, it strangely found that the 
excessive fares paid by those Americans, to fly to the United States, constituted a 
foreign injury—because the flights did not originate in the United States.116  In 
doing so, the court rejected the obvious facts that the same planes that flew to the 
United States were returning to the Asian destinations; that the fares to and from 
the United States were similar and linked; and, perhaps most importantly, that the 
U.S.-based resources of these passengers was diminished by the price-fixing 
conspiracy.117 
These instances of limiting protection under the antitrust laws for American 
consumers—and, ironically, expanding the range of immunity for foreign 
defendants for their behavior that harms those American consumers—can hardly 
have been the goal of FTAIA.  To the contrary, they undermine the goals of the 
antitrust regime.118 
                                                                                                     
directed at fixing the cost of airfreight necessarily affects the commerce in the goods transported by 
airfreight”). 
 114. Today, of course, that carriage would probably be subject to various limitations, surcharges, 
penalties, and so forth. 
 115. FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. §6a (2006) (quoted in full supra in Section II). 
 116. Transpacific Passenger Air Transp., 2011 WL 1753738, at *5-8. 
 117. Id.  See also In re Korean Air Lines Co. Antitrust Litig., No. CV 07-01891, 2010 WL 3184372 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (reaching similar conclusions regarding purchases of air tickets for flights from 
Korea to the United States). 
 118. The case law under the FTAIA also reflects a significantly reduced solicitude for invoking the 
American antitrust laws with respect to injury to non-Americans, even if that harm is the result of anti-
competitive behavior taking place in the United States.  A leading example is Turicentro, S.A. v. 
American Airlines, 303 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2002).  The plaintiffs were travel agents located in Central 
America.  Id. at 297.  They alleged that the defendants—American air carriers and a U.S. airline trade 
association—had conspired to reduce the commissions paid to them for air travel both in the United 
States and between the United States and Latin America.  Id.  The court of appeals concluded that these 
claims were barred by the FTAIA, because they did not have the requisite “effect” on U.S. commerce.  
Id. at 305.   Here, the harm was to competition among non-American travel agents, and the “United 
States antitrust laws only apply when a price-fixing conspiracy affects the domestic economy.”  Id. 
Although some might argue that this result is “unfortunate,” it presents the obverse situation from the 
McLafferty and Transpacific Passenger Air Transportation decisions.  As a matter of policy, Empagran 
can be read for the sound proposition that the American antitrust laws are not designed to protect the 
world from all types of anti-competitive behavior.  Thus, these non-American plaintiffs were outside the 
pale of protection, and it was irrelevant that some of their customers were Americans or that the 
offending behavior took place in the United States.  But in the two cases discussed in the text, the 
plaintiffs were American.  Empagran should not be read to extend the FTAIA as a shield for defendants, 
whether they be American or foreign, from anti-competitive behavior which harms American 
consumers. 
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Unfortunately, numerous courts have given the “import” provision an unduly 
narrow reading.  For example, some cases hold that it applied only if the defendants 
were the physical importers of the goods.119  However, the better reading, found in 
other decisions, is that FTAIA is inapplicable so long as the defendants’ conduct 
was directed at an American import market, or “to phrase it slightly differently, the 
import trade or commerce exception [merely] requires that the defendants’ conduct 
target import goods or services.”120  “Import trade” has been given a narrow 
interpretation by another line of cases, whereby courts have insisted that the focus 
should be solely on whether the defendant’s conduct “involved” import trade or 
commerce, while ignoring the fact that the plaintiff may have been involved in the 
importation of goods (or perhaps services).121 
There are other decisions which have likewise given the FTAIA an overly 
expansive reading on other questions.   For example, some cases have unduly 
elevated the requirement that the defendant’s conduct have a “direct . . . effect” on 
non-import commerce.122  As a result, courts have dismissed claims although the 
defendants’ alleged antitrust violations resulted in artificially higher prices for 
components of products purchased abroad that were in turn incorporated in goods 
sold to retailers and consumers in the United States at elevated prices—clearly 
producing a domestic harm.123  The justification given for these dismissals is that 
the chain of distribution was assertedly too long or too difficult to follow.124  The 
bottom line, however, is that in these and other cases, the FTAIA is being applied 
in ways which are not required to meet its goal of promoting American business, 
and in particular export business.  At the same time, the courts are further 
undermining the vitality of the antitrust laws as an important means of promoting 
consumer welfare for American individuals and corporations.125 
                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 
F. Supp.2d 320, 369 (D. N.J. 2010). 
 120. See Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2011),  
cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1744 (2012). 
 121. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, 303 F.3d 293, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2002); Kruman v. 
Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2002).  See also Carpet Group Int’l v. Oriental Rug 
Importers Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 71-73 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that defendants’ conduct sufficiently 
involved import trade, to bring plaintiff’s complaint within exception to FTAIA). 
 122. See, e.g., U.S. v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘direct effect’ means that 
there must be an ‘immediate consequence’ of the alleged anticompetitive conduct with no ‘intervening 
developments’”); In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp.2d 555, 560 (D. Del. 
2006) (quoting  LSL Biotechs). 
 123. See In re Intel, 452 F. Supp.2d at 561 (describing plaintiff’s claim as “full of twists and turns,” 
and rejecting “allegations of foreign conduct [that] result in nothing more than what courts have termed 
a ‘ripple effect’ on the United States domestic market”). 
 124. See In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 476 F. Supp.2d 452, 456 (D. Del. 2007) 
(asserting that a “speculative chain of events is insufficient to create the direct, substantial and 
foreseeable effects on commerce required by the FTAIA”). 
 125. In The ‘In’ Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 497-501 (M.D.N.C. 1987), 
the plaintiff, a French distributor of the defendant’s products in Europe, had entered into an exclusive 
distributorship agreement with the defendant, pursuant to which the plaintiff had terminated its 
distributorship arrangements with a number of other American manufacturers.  After the defendant 
subsequently terminated the agreement, plaintiff asserted various antitrust claims.  Id. at 496-97.  To 
attempt to overcome the FTAIA requirement that there be a “domestic effect” of the defendant’s 
conduct, the plaintiff pointed to the business assertedly lost by the other American exporters.  Id. at 499-
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Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the opinions engage merely in an 
elementary level of statutory interpretation.  They leave unexamined the competing 
values that underlie the possible alternate interpretations.  Arguably, the courts are 
seeking to protect the interests of American companies doing business abroad and 
of foreign companies doing business in the United States, with the unstated 
assumption that somehow this will result in a net benefit to the American economy.  
The unwillingness to allow American consumers harmed by that behavior to sue 
for antitrust redress may implicitly be the necessary evil to protect those business 
entities. 
Thankfully, the landscape is not totally bleak.  In addition to the recent 
Seventh Circuit decision in Minn-Chem described above,126 there are other 
important decisions that have recognized the broader reach of American antitrust 
laws, notwithstanding some of the limitations erected by the FTAIA.  Thus, some 
courts have properly taken a more expansive view of the “domestic effects” 
exception to FTAIA.  For example, a district court recently held that direct 
purchasers of products which were billed to parties in the United States could 
complain of a price-fixing conspiracy, even if those products were shipped to 
purchasers outside the United States.127  Because the plaintiffs had alleged that the 
defendants had broadly targeted the American market, the court correctly 
concluded that the conspiracy had a direct effect on domestic commerce and that 
the overcharge for purchases made in the United States gave “rise to” their antitrust 
claims.128 
In another case, a district court concluded that FTAIA did not preclude a 
challenge by an American brewer to the acquisition by one of its American 
competitors of a major Canadian brewer with which the plaintiff had had a 
licensing agreement.129  The court agreed that the acquisition would have effects 
not only on the plaintiff’s export trade to Canada—which presumably would not be 
subject to an antitrust challenge because of FTAIA—“but also, albeit less directly, 
on the United States beer market and the consumers in that market.”130 
The Third Circuit has also made it clear that the plaintiffs do not need to prove 
that the defendant subjectively intended to impact commerce in the United 
States.131  Rather, FTAIA adopts an objective standard:  It is sufficient for the 
                                                                                                     
500.  Rejecting this theory, the court concluded that “an antitrust plaintiff . . . must prove . . . (1) the 
defendant’s conduct must have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on (2) plaintiff’s 
continuing ability to export products (3) from the United States.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 126. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text. 
 127. In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07–md–01819 CW, 2010 
WL 5477313 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010). 
 128. Id. at *5-7.  See also Precision Assocs., Inc. v. Panalpina World Transp. (Holding) Ltd., No. 07–
md–01819 CW, 2011 WL 7053807, at *36-37 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 4, 2011) (holding that conspiracy by 
freight-forwarders elevating prices for shipment of goods exported from foreign locations into the U.S. 
had a direct effect on the prices of goods themselves and thus were within an exception to FTAIA). 
 129. Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 889 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Col. 1995). 
 130. Id. at 1398.  Cf. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 07–1827 SI, CR 09–0110 
SI, 2011 WL 1464858, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (concluding that FTAIA did not bar a criminal 
indictment charging criminal behavior that occurred both outside of and within the United States, 
including an “overt act in furtherance of conspiracy” in the United States). 
 131. See Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S.Ct. 1744 (2012). 
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plaintiff to show that the adverse effects on domestic commerce were foreseeable 
to an “objectively reasonable person.”132 
There is one set of decisions which may have a positive effect on the 
protective reach of the antitrust laws.  An interpretive question is whether the 
provisions in FTAIA are jurisdictional or substantive—i.e., whether they bar the 
court from hearing the case at all, or are instead limitations on the substantive 
scope of the Sherman Act. 
A large number of earlier cases had concluded that the statute was 
jurisdictional.133  However, in a non-antitrust case,134 the Supreme Court recently 
held that statutes should be viewed as non-jurisdictional unless Congress “clearly 
states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional.”135  As a result, several recent decisions have extended that 
presumption to FTAIA.136  Other cases have continued to view FTAIA as 
jurisdictional.137  Still other courts have declined to resolve the question.138 
The difference is significant both from a procedural and a practical 
perspective.139  A substantive challenge would be raised by a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim140 (in which case all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations 
must be taken as true) or pursuant to a motion for summary judgment (if there are 
disputed facts).141  Under both of these latter motions, the burden of proof would be 
on the defendant.142  To the extent that there are disputed facts, the plaintiff would 
be entitled to some pre-trial discovery, raising the likelihood that the defendant 
might settle. 
By contrast, if the bar is jurisdictional, an action complaining of foreign 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 471. 
 133. See, e.g., U.S. v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 677-83 (9th Cir. 2004); United 
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. 
Airlines, 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002); Carpet Group Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, 227 
F.3d 62, 69-73 (3d Cir. 2000); Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom, S.A., 212 F. Supp.2d 183, 188-89, 198-
99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 134. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 135. Id. at 515.  See also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 136. See, e.g., Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, 683 F.3d 845, 851 (2012) (en banc) (overruling United 
Phosphorus); Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 465-69 (3d Cir. 
2011) (suggesting that United Phosphorus may be “ripe for reconsideration”), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 
1744 (2012); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp.2d 953, 957-59 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 137. See, e.g., In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07–md–01819 
CW, 2010 WL 5477313, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010) (feeling bound by Circuit precedent); 
McLafferty v. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., No. 08-1706, 2009 WL 3365881 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009) 
(treating question as one involving subject matter jurisdiction); Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc., 608 F. Supp.2d 1166, 1184-85 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (same). 
 138. See, e.g., In re DRAM Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008); Boyd v. AWB 
Ltd., 544 F. Supp.2d 236, 243 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  See also Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 
430, 439 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to resolve whether Alcoa’s “effects” requirement for application 
of the Sherman Act is jurisdictional). 
 139. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, 683 F.3d 845, 852-53 (2012) (en banc) (“This is not a picky 
point that is of interest only to procedure buffs.  Rather, this distinction affects how disputed facts are 
handled, and it determines when a party may raise the point.”). 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 142. See, e.g., Animal Science Prods., 654 F.3d at 469 n.9.   
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activity would be subject to challenge under Rule 12(b)(1),143 and the burden of 
proof would be on the plaintiff.  And, on jurisdictional challenges, the court need 
not confine its analysis to the pleadings and other materials submitted by the 
parties, and it need not make all inferences on behalf of the non-moving party.144 
CONCLUSION 
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 was intended to 
promote exports from the United States by shielding exporters from antitrust 
liability for harm to non-American consumers.  But, under FTAIA, the Sherman 
Act remains fully applicable to foreign behavior having an adverse effect on 
domestic commerce and import commerce.  The Seventh Circuit’s recent Minn-
Chem decision recognizes the importance of continued application of the antitrust 
laws to this behavior.  Regrettably, too many other courts have given an unduly 
expansive reading to the carve-out from the reach of the antitrust to certain foreign 
behavior.  Not only are these decisions inconsistent with the legislative purpose of 
FTAIA—they also deny the competitive benefits which the antitrust laws are 
designed to confer on American consumers. 
These cases are part of a larger trend in the last 35 years of cutting back on the 
protections afforded by the antitrust laws.  As incorrect as those decisions may be, 
they may in part be explained by the countervailing concerns of undue burdens 
imposed on American companies supplying goods and services.  But that 
explanation cannot be extended to conduct undertaken principally by non-
American suppliers that adversely affects commerce in or to the United States and 
harms American consumers. 
So, enough already!  It is past time either for the courts—including the 
Supreme Court—to right this misdirection in the interpretation of FTAIA, or for 
Congress to make the necessary statutory revisions.  Congress or the Court needs to 
make clear that the antitrust laws reach all conduct, domestic and foreign, that 
harms competition in the United States. 
 
                                                                                                     
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
 144. See generally Alicia Batts & Keith Butler, Recovery in the United States for Price-Fixing 
Abroad:  The Future of FTAIA Litigation, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (2011) (noting circuit split, and 
urging Supreme Court review); Edward Valdespino, Shifting Viewpoints:  The Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act, A Substantive or Jurisdictional Approach, 45 TEX. INT’L L. J. 457 (2009). 
